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A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEORY OF THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 
Mark Tushnet* 
This Essay offers a brief and highly speculative political, intellec-
tual, and legal history of the theory of the unitary executive in the 
late twentieth century.1  I suggest that that theory developed in three 
stages, which I label the weak, the strong, and the super-strong versions, 
and confronted one alternative that superficially resembled the the-
ory of the unitary executive but that actually served quite different 
political, intellectual, and legal purposes.  Further, I suggest that the 
second stage followed the first, and the third the second; the weak 
version was articulated on the arrival of the Reagan administration in 
1981, the strong version during the late Reagan and Bush I admini-
strations, and the super-strong version during the Bush II administra-
tion.2  And, finally, as those temporal linkages suggest, I will argue 
that each version of the theory and its alternative fit into the political 
agendas of these four administrations and were thought to be solu-
tions to specific problems each administration faced. 
A preliminary note on what I mean by a “theory” of the unitary 
executive:  my argument is, in part, that such a theory emerged out of 
the political setting the Reagan administration faced.3  This is not to 
say, of course, that arguments for the proposition that the President 
has important and indivisible powers were not made before then, nor 
that there were no earlier cases and practices supporting that propo-
sition.  Indeed, a theory, in the sense I use the term, would be sense-
less absent such cases and practices.  But, I believe, when claims 
 
 * William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I thank Jacob Gersen, 
Jack Goldsmith, and Adrian Vermeuele for their (mostly skeptical) comments on an ear-
lier version of this Essay. 
 1 The history is speculative because I have not done the necessary archival research to find 
support for many of my suggestions. 
 2 The alternative theory was the creature of the Clinton and (perhaps) the Obama admini-
strations. 
 3 One indication of the timing of the theory’s emergence is that a February 2009 search of 
the HeinOnline law review data base produced 1,118 hits for “unitary executive,” of 
which only eight occurred prior to 1981.  (Two or three of the latter dealt exclusively with 
state-level arrangements, but presumably so would some number of the larger number of 
hits.) 
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about the President’s authority within the national executive struc-
ture were made before the Reagan administration, they were not part 
of a general theory about the unitariness of the executive.  A theory 
of the unitary executive brings together into an integrated, overarch-
ing account ideas, cases, and practices that earlier were as a matter of 
legal “consciousness” understood to deal with discrete topics.  Impor-
tantly, the theory will be only partly integrated as it develops.  In con-
sequence, at some intermediate stage of the theory’s development, 
proponents of the theory will still treat some doctrines about presi-
dential power as independent of the partially integrated theory they 
have at hand.  Only later will those doctrines be themselves inte-
grated into a now broader theory of the unitary executive.4 
Consider federalism as an analogue.  At one point, and to some 
extent still, courts use one set of doctrinal tools to determine whether 
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate some subject 
by exercising its power to regulate commerce among the several 
states, and another set of doctrinal tools to determine whether a con-
dition Congress imposes on states that receive federal funds is consti-
tutionally permissible.  At another point, scholars and the courts be-
gin to see both problems as problems of “federalism,” and develop a 
“theory” of federalism into which both sets of doctrines fit comforta-
bly—and, to the extent that specific doctrines do not fit easily into 
the theory of federalism, those doctrines are criticized by scholars 
and adjusted by the courts so that they do fit. 
One can account for the development of theories of this sort in a 
number of ways.  A purely intellectual interest in reducing doctrinal 
complexity might motivate a scholar to develop a theory, for exam-
ple.  In this Essay, I offer a mainly political account of the develop-
ment of the theory of the unitary executive.  Pure doctrine is not ab-
sent from my account, though.  Specifically, the solution of the 
doctrinal problems that are the focus of the theory’s development at 
one stage opens up new doctrinal questions.5  If the political circum-
stances are favorable, those questions will be addressed and the an-
swers integrated into a broader theory.6 
 
 4 And, of course, on the level of individual commitment, a person can entirely reasonably 
contend that, although others include many doctrines within their theory of the unitary 
executive, she does not think that one or more of them should be integrated into such a 
theory. 
 5 The typical form of such questions is something like this:  Doesn’t the position the theory 
takes on this question imply that it needs to offer an answer to that one? 
 6 If the circumstances are not favorable, the open questions will come to be understood as 
reasonably excluded from the theory’s scope. 
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I.  THE WEAK THEORY OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
According to the weak theory, to which Professors Calabresi and 
Yoo subscribe, the national executive is unitary in the sense that the 
President has the power to provide policy direction to officers of the 
United States,7 to remove from their positions any such officers who 
refuse to comply with the President’s policy directions, and (perhaps) 
to implement presidentially determined policy directly by transmit-
ting policy directives to employees who are obliged to carry them out 
or themselves face dismissal.8  This theory seems so weak that one 
would be hard-pressed to understand why it emerged until one took 
into account its political context. 
That context was the arrival of the Reagan administration in 1981.  
That administration faced several challenges from a bureaucratic or 
staffing point of view.  Its leadership was committed to a substantial 
change in the national government’s programmatic commitments.  
In political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s terms, Ronald Reagan was 
a “reconstructive” President.9  Understanding that the New Deal and 
Great Society constitutional orders were vulnerable, Reagan sought to 
restructure the national government through a “new Federalism” that 
devolved power to the states, while maintaining a substantial world-
wide military posture.  According to Skowronek, reconstructive Presi-
dents must both destroy the remnants of the constitutional order 
they seek to replace, and construct new institutions that implement 
the new constitutional order and, importantly, provide it with the po-
litical resources to perpetuate itself. 
 
 7 And through them, to employees of the United States. 
 8 But see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (arguing that the President lacks power to implement pol-
icy directly, at least in the face of legislation allocating policy-making authority to officers 
of the United States).  Perhaps we could give the label “super-weak” to a theory under 
which the President can discharge executive officers at will but cannot insist that, while 
they occupy office, they follow the President’s directions on specific matters or when 
Congress has good reasons for delegating decision-making authority to the officer rather 
than the President.  For some indications that the Supreme Court once held such a view, 
see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (“Of course there may be duties so pecu-
liarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a ques-
tion whether the President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statu-
tory duty in a particular instance.  Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character 
imposed on executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions after 
hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President can not in a 
particular case properly influence or control.”).  I would note, though, that such a view 
would probably not qualify as a theory in the sense I have described in the text above. 
 9 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:  LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS 
TO GEORGE BUSH 414–29 (1993) (describing Ronald Reagan as a reconstructive leader). 
316 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
The Reagan administration’s difficulty was that it lacked the staff 
to carry out the negative and positive components of its own pro-
gram.  That program required the dismantling of the bureaucratic 
structures implementing New Deal and Great Society programs, and 
substituting new structures.  The number of people committed to the 
Reagan administration’s reconstructive efforts was small.  The con-
servative movement had not yet generated enough personnel to place 
a substantial number of supporters in existing bureaucracies.  Put 
crudely, there were too many positions to fill, and too little time.10 
Many of those already staffing the bureaucracies had gone into 
government service because they agreed with the New Deal and Great 
Society missions, and even those who simply sought government em-
ployment because it was relatively secure typically became “mission-
committed.”  Changing their orientation would be difficult, perhaps 
to the point where the bureaucracies would obstruct the implementa-
tion of the administration’s programs.  Even more, conservatives had 
not reconstructed the Republican party itself.  Some cabinet positions 
and other important high-level executive offices had to be allocated 
not according to the position-holders’ adherence to the administra-
tion’s new programmatic commitments, but to traditional interest-
group principles. 
Further, the constitutional culture within Washington gave those 
entrenched in the bureaucracies powerful weapons.  Decades of New 
Deal dominance had generated a culture in which it was thought that 
line bureaucrats and high-level officials often ought to be independ-
ent of the transient enthusiasms of administrations newly arrived in 
the city.  The well-known “iron triangle” supported bureaucratic in-
dependence of direction from the White House.11  Bureaucrats, 
members of Congress (and their staffs), and interest-group lobbyists 
stood in opposition to every administration’s efforts to alter specific 
programs from which the iron triangles benefited.  Finally, a wide-
spread (mis)interpretation of Humphrey’s Executor gave officials a 
strong sense that the President could not dismiss them if they dis-
agreed with or even resisted his political initiatives.12 
 
 10 Steven M. Teles provides some support for this observation in Transformative Bureaucracy:  
Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 61 
(2009). 
 11 On the iron triangle, see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES 35–37 (1984). 
 12 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935), held no more than that 
statutes could constitutionally require that the President have cause to dismiss a high-level 
administrative official, but did not address the question of whether disagreement or resis-
tance amounted to cause. 
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Under these circumstances bureaucrats, both on the line and in 
high positions, reasonably believed that in practice they could not be 
dislodged from their positions.  And, they might well have thought 
that they could ride out whatever temporary disruptions the Reagan 
administration’s initiatives might cause.  After all—a point to which I 
return in Part IV—early on no one can know whether a President 
seeking to reconstruct a constitutional regime will succeed in doing 
so. 
The weak theory of the unitary executive was attractive as a means 
of countering the bureaucratic resistance the Reagan administration 
faced.13  It provided constitutional arguments that could break the 
link between the bureaucrats and the other legs of the iron triangle.  
It reminded low-level bureaucrats that the position of quasi-
independence they had achieved by the end of the Great Society 
rested on political and not constitutional foundations.14  Perhaps 
most important, the weak theory opened up the possibility of chal-
lenging Humphrey’s Executor, which—had it succeeded—would have 
shown that high-level officers had to come into line with the Presi-
dent’s programmatic commitments and could not rely, at least in 
constitutional terms, on support from interest groups outside the 
administration. 
Notably, the weak theory of the unitary executive suggested that 
the mere existence of independent agencies posed constitutional 
problems, and critics of the Reagan administration’s version of that 
theory regularly pointed that out.15  The administration did not dis-
claim those implications.16  Yet, neither did it actually do anything 
 
 13 For a prescient argument by a traditional conservative that conservatives should start to 
articulate a theory about unitary executive authority, precisely because taking over the 
government would require disciplining the bureaucracy, see Jeffrey Hart, The Presidency:  
Shifting Conservative Perspectives?, 26 NAT’L REV. 1351 (1974).  Hart wrote: 
One long term change in the equation of political power involves the steady 
growth of the federal bureaucracy, which . . . actually operates with considerable 
autonomy. . . . [T]he only way these agencies can be diverted . . . is through the ac-
tion of a powerful President. . . . [A]t least until the retirement of the present sen-
ior civil servants in the bureaucracy . . . if conservatives wish to get the “executive 
branch” behind policies they deem desirable, they can do so only by supporting a 
powerful and activist Presidency. 
  Id. at 1353.  I thank Jack Goldsmith for bringing this article to my attention. 
 14 That is, it reminded them that quasi-independence arose because Great Society politi-
cians agreed with what the bureaucrats were doing and were content to leave them alone. 
 15 For a nearly contemporaneous overview, see Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent 
Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779. 
 16 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000:  CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 180 (1988) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000] (“The 
‘unitary Executive’ principle of Article II also provides a basis to question the viability of 
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about independent agencies, because its deregulatory efforts focused 
on policies adopted and implemented by executive agencies such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of the Inte-
rior, and the Department of Transportation.17 
Seen in this political perspective, the weak theory was a partial 
success.  It did start the process of bringing the federal bureaucracies 
into conformity with the Reagan administration’s programs.  It was 
less successful at higher levels, largely because reconstructing the Re-
publican party would be more important there.  Until conservatives 
could ensure that cabinet and like positions would be filled by con-
servatives without constraint from traditional interest groups, high-
level officials would be able to act independently of “their” Presi-
dent’s programmatic commitments. 
II.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE STRONG THEORY OF THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 
By the late 1980s the Reagan administration’s reconstructive am-
bitions were well on the way to success.  Some civil service bureaucrats 
had shifted gears, others had left government employment.  The in-
stitutions associated with the conservative movement—think tanks 
such as the Heritage Foundation and organizations such as the Fed-
eralist Society—were in a position to supply the administration with 
 
‘independent’ agencies in their present form. . . . [B]ecause the Constitution vests all ex-
ecutive power in a President, Congress may not give executive power to agencies that are 
not under the President’s control.” (citation omitted)).  This expression of the position 
came relatively late in the Reagan administration, but it was articulated earlier.  See Stuart 
Taylor, Jr., A Question of Power, a Powerful Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8 (not-
ing Attorney General Meese’s comments “that the entire system of independent agencies 
may be unconstitutional”), cited in Verkuil, supra note 15, at 779; see also Special Prosecutor 
Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of 
Gov't Mgmt of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1981) (state-
ment of Rudolph Giuliani, Associate Att’y Gen.), cited in Charles Tiefer, The Constitutional-
ity of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61 n.13 
(1983).  As Tiefer’s article also shows, and consistent with my earlier observations about 
the relation between scattered precedents and a “theory” of the unitary executive, Presi-
dents had lodged constitutional objections to the creation of some independent officers 
earlier—but not, it seems, to already existing independent agencies. 
 17 I do not think it accidental that the two major Supreme Court cases dealing with the 
power a new administration has to alter policies adopted by its predecessor involved de-
regulatory efforts by the Reagan Environmental Protection Agency and Department of 
Transportation.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (upholding a deregulatory initiative undertaken by the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1981); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (invalidating a deregulatory initiative undertaken by the Department of Transpor-
tation in 1981). 
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personnel to staff many of the positions below the cabinet level and 
thereby to exercise some degree of political control over line bureau-
crats.18  The Republican party had come under conservative control, 
allowing the President to appoint conservatives to high-level positions 
while satisfying the demands of traditional interest groups—or at 
least while getting those interest groups to knuckle under.  Two prob-
lems remained.  A minor one was the continued role of truly inde-
pendent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Federal Trade Commission in national governance.  The ma-
jor one was divided government:  Democrats remained in control of 
Congress, and were in a position to obstruct the administration’s re-
constructive initiatives. 
The solution to both problems lay in the strengthening of the 
theory of the unitary executive.  The weak theory held that the Presi-
dent had the power to control policy-development by choosing the 
high-level officials who would do so at his behest (or face dismissal) 
and by directing low-level bureaucrats to implement the President’s 
programs.  A stronger theory of the unitary executive addressed the 
problem of independent agencies by asserting that they were uncon-
stitutional because they exercised executive (or, sometimes, legisla-
tive) power and therefore had to be structurally within the executive 
branch and so subject to the President’s control pursuant to the weak 
theory.19  The stronger theory necessarily required a constitutional 
definition of what powers were truly executive (or legislative), a defi-
nition that would provide powerful support for the proposition that 
Congress lacked the power to enact statutes that allocated truly ex-
ecutive power to someone other than the President. 
The constitutional challenge to independent agencies moved 
along two lines, prefigured in earlier cases and theorizing but not to 
that point integrated into a theory of the unitary executive.  The Rea-
gan administration offered some, mostly background, support to 
 
 18 Eventually this method of control metastasized in the hiring processes of the Department 
of Justice in the administration of George W. Bush.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & 
OFFICER OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL DECISIONS IN THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/oig-op-iaph-
crd.pdf.  Political supervision of the bureaucracy within legal bounds is neither improper 
nor unusual, and no one has credibly argued that such control by the late Reagan ad-
ministration and by the George H.W. Bush administration exceeded legal limits. 
 19 I suspect, though without evidence, that the only major independent agency that had 
some potential to disrupt deregulatory initiatives was the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission. 
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those who wished to revive the non-delegation doctrine.20  Formally at 
least, doing so would not necessarily have advanced the Reagan ad-
ministration’s programmatic agenda.  Congress could substitute de-
tailed legislation for delegations to independent agencies.  But, as vir-
tually all participants in these discussions understood, reviving the 
non-delegation doctrine was politically and functionally part of a lar-
ger deregulatory agenda.  Politically, modern government could not 
proceed in the absence of delegations, which is why the non-
delegation doctrine had withered away.  Reviving it would produce 
paralysis, not more detailed regulations prescribed directly by Con-
gress.  And functionally, detailed legislation would be subject to the 
presidential veto, which would surely be forthcoming were Congress 
to seek to design detailed regulations. 
The second line of attack was on the very idea of independent 
agencies.  This culminated in the conservative position in Morrison v. 
Olson, articulated most forcefully in Justice Antonin Scalia’s (sole) 
dissent.21  According to that position, prosecution was inherently an 
executive function, which Congress could not assign to an entity not 
under the President’s ultimate control.  Note how the strong theory 
of the unitary executive differs from the weak one:  under the weak 
theory, Congress cannot impose constraints on the President’s ability 
to control those who all concede to be within the executive branch, 
whereas the strong theory identifies constitutional limits on the pow-
er of Congress to define the contours of that branch. 
In Morrison v. Olson the Supreme Court rejected one component 
of the strong theory of the unitary executive, and more than a decade 
later it rejected another when it upheld a rather vague delegation of 
rule-making authority in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations.22  
Yet, the strong theory of the unitary executive remained available 
within conservative constitutional discourse.  And, indeed, almost 
necessarily so.  Relatively early in the development of the theory of 
the unitary executive, Edwin Meese had articulated a departmentalist 
theory of constitutional interpretation, asserting that decisions by the 
Supreme Court were not conclusive on the President, who had the 
power—and almost certainly the duty—under the Constitution to ar-
ticulate and act upon his own interpretations of the Constitution, 
 
 20 See THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 16, at 180 (“Under a strict Madison-
ian concept of separation of powers, the Court conceivably could hold that the Congres-
sional delegation of rulemaking functions to the Executive branch or to independent 
agencies violates the separation of powers.”). 
 21 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 22 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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even if those interpretations were contrary to those proffered by the 
Supreme Court.23  The Supreme Court’s reasons for rejecting com-
ponents of the strong theory might have to be taken into account, 
but the mere fact of the Court’s decisions had little importance.  So, 
when in 1988 the Reagan administration’s Department of Justice 
published its study, The Constitution in the Year 2000, it listed under the 
heading “Potential Controversies for the 1990’s” the following:  “Un-
der what circumstances, if any, does the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers permit Congress to assign Executive functions, 
such as the power of prosecution, to officials outside the control of the 
Executive, whether organized in independent agencies or appointed 
by an authority other than the Executive?”24  One could contend—
barely—that Morrison v. Olson left the Department’s question open 
because the question related to the circumstances under which such 
assignments could occur and not to whether such assignments were 
always unconstitutional, but the tenor of the question certainly is that 
the strong theory of the unitary executive remained an available op-
tion. 
Importantly, this “such as” formulation brought out an aspect of 
the strong theory of the unitary executive that would become cen-
trally important during the George W. Bush administration.  Perhaps 
distracted by the controversies of the moment, those who articulated 
the strong theory during the Reagan administration focused on the 
executive power to prosecute, but what mattered to the theory was 
the identification of inherently executive powers.  Or, as Justice Scalia 
put it in his Morrison dissent, the power to prosecute was a “quintes-
sential[] executive activity.”25  The full elaboration of the strong the-
ory of the unitary executive required identification of the full set of 
inherently executive powers that Congress could not assign else-
where—or otherwise control. 
Matters had improved substantially from the vantage point of 
staffing when a Republican returned to the White House in 2001.  
Conservatives had come to dominate the party almost completely, al-
lowing them to fill cabinet and sub-cabinet positions with little oppo-
sition from traditional interest groups within the party.  The pipeline 
 
 23 Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985–86 (1987) (“The 
Supreme Court . . . is not the only interpreter of the Constitution.  Each of the three co-
ordinate branches of government . . . has a duty to interpret the Constitution in the per-
formance of its official functions.  In fact, every official takes an oath precisely to that ef-
fect.”). 
 24 THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000, supra note 16, at 183, 184 (emphasis added). 
 25 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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to lower level positions was reasonably large; Republican control of 
the presidency in the 1980s and of Congress in much of the 1990s 
produced staffers comfortable with moving into the bureaucracy at 
the middle levels, and the institutions supplying personnel to the 
conservative movement as such—again, the Federalist Society and by 
the 2000s Regent University Law School serve as examples—had be-
come integrated into the Republican governing project. 
From another point of view, though, matters were more difficult.  
This vantage point was the President’s.  George W. Bush was what 
Skowronek calls an “affiliated” President.26  Such Presidents face a 
complex set of difficulties.  They are affiliated with a prior recon-
structive President—for Bush, Ronald Reagan—and seek to com-
plete, perpetuate, and deepen that President’s agenda.  They also 
want to place their own mark on the agenda.  So, for example, 
George W. Bush’s slogans about an ownership society and his free-
dom agenda were versions of Reagan’s, updated for the 2000s but al-
so transformed somewhat to make them Bush’s rather than Reagan’s.  
Yet, affiliated Presidents do not face a prior political regime on whose 
vulnerabilities their reconstructive predecessors were able to capital-
ize.  And, finally, the simple passage of time reduces the political en-
ergy available for the tasks the affiliated President wants to finish.  
True, those tasks are smaller than the ones facing the reconstructive 
President, and so might require less political energy.  But, affiliated 
Presidents need to have distinctive programs bearing their own 
stamp, and enacting those programs will call for energy that the affili-
ated presidency may lack. 
There was one additional feature of George W. Bush’s situation 
that affected the development of a super-strong theory of the unitary 
presidency.  The Reagan Revolution had never achieved complete 
success.  Instead, it produced an extended period of divided govern-
ment, which had its own regime principles.27  Those principles were 
vulnerable, not because the American people had become disen-
chanted with them but because every election presented the oppor-
tunity to replace divided with unified government.  That possibility 
guided the George W. Bush presidency’s actions. 
 
 26 For a useful discussion of George W. Bush as an affiliated President, see Gerard N. Mag-
liocca, George W. Bush in Political Time:  The Janus Presidency, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473 
(2009) (reviewing how theories in the recent books of Stephen Skowronek and Keith 
Whittington can be applied to George W. Bush’s presidency). 
 27 For my analysis of the constitutional implications of divided government, see MARK 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003). 
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Taking office without the support of a majority of those who had 
voted in November 2000,28 Bush could accomplish little legislatively at 
the outset without substantial support from his political opponents.  
As President, though, he might be able to push his initiatives 
through.  To do so, the strong theory of the unitary executive had to 
be strengthened further.  The strong theory held that Congress could 
not “divide” inherently executive authority—or, alternatively, that on-
ly the President could exercise executive power.  The open questions 
were, what inherent authority does the President have, and what was 
the executive power committed exclusively to the President?  Narrow 
answers to those questions would not have been inconsistent with the 
strong theory of the unitary executive as it had developed by the early 
1990s—but, importantly, neither would broad answers. 
Indeed, officials of the Bush administration typically continued to 
use the term “unitary executive” to refer only to the strong theory, 
even as they defended broad answers to those questions, which they 
tended to regard as not (yet) integrated into their theory of the uni-
tary presidency.29  Outsiders—scholars and newspaper commenta-
tors—might see the Bush administration as defending a super-strong 
theory of the unitary executive, but their terminology differed from 
that used by the administration itself, which distinguished between 
the strong theory of the unitary executive to which they were commit-
ted and a strong but independent theory of broad presidential pow-
ers as Commander-in-Chief to which they were also committed. 
Broad answers to questions about the President’s inherent powers 
served George W. Bush’s interests as an affiliated President.  In addi-
tion, the events of September 11, 2001, had two effects.  They pre-
sented Bush with the opportunity to become something of a recon-
structive President himself.  They also provided a direct path to 
expansive definitions of inherent executive authority.  Serious and 
seemingly permanent threats to national security in a context of ob-
vious military conflicts made it plausible to load a great deal into the 
President’s status as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.  The 
“Take Care” Clause could be given expansive readings as well.  It 
could be read, as many scholars had contended for years, to require 
that the President take care that all the laws, including the Constitu-
tion, be faithfully executed.  This reading supported departmentalist 
approaches to constitutional interpretation, and thereby made it pos-
 
 28 FEC, 2000 Presidential General Election Results, http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/
2000presgeresults.htm. 
 29 I thank Jack Goldsmith for emphasizing this point to me. 
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sible for the President to argue, with more than a little plausibility, 
that he was entitled to disregard legislation that in his view en-
croached on authority the Constitution gave to the President alone.  
The “Take Care” Clause could also be read along the lines of Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln’s question:  “Are all the laws but one to go un-
executed, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be vio-
lated?”30  That is, the President’s primary duty is to take care that the 
nation be preserved, to which the duty to take care that the laws, in-
cluding the Constitution, be faithfully executed, is subordinate.31  All 
this became embedded in the super-strong theory of the unitary pres-
idency with which the Bush administration became identified.32 
Bush’s reconstructive ambitions foundered in part because of pol-
icy errors he made, but probably more important because of a rea-
sonable but, as it turned out, mistaken political strategy.  In the face 
of a closely divided electorate that in 2000 had not seen much differ-
ence between the leading candidates for the presidency,33 Bush and 
his advisors decided that they were unlikely to build a governing coa-
lition by drawing into the Republican party a large number of centrist 
voters.  Instead of seeking a governing coalition supported by 55% of 
the voters, they decided to construct such a coalition by consolidating 
the Republican party as an ideologically conservative one and then 
seeking just enough votes to get them above 50% in successive elec-
tions.  For a while that strategy seemed to work, but perceived failures 
in Iraq and on domestic policy demonstrated how difficult it was to 
consolidate a reconstructive presidency supported by a mere (and 
narrow) majority of the electorate. 
George W. Bush’s effort to move from being an affiliated Presi-
dent to being a reconstructive one was connected to the super-strong 
theory of the unitary presidency.  That theory emerged from the po-
 
 30 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 20 (1897). 
 31 For a version of this argument, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004). 
 32 The fact that journalistic accounts of the Bush administration’s theory rarely distin-
guished the super-strong theory of the unitary presidency from the weaker theories that 
had been articulated earlier is one datum suggesting that there actually was a new theory 
in the air, even if not fully acknowledged as such by Bush administration officials. 
 33 See D. Sunshine Hillygus & Simon Jackman, Voter Decision Making in Election 2000:  Cam-
paign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 583, 594 (2003) 
(asserting that “the public was not overly enthused about either candidate” in 2000); Ar-
thur H. Miller & Thomas F. Klobucar, The Role of Issues in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election, 
33 PRES. STUD. Q. 101, 121 (2003) (concluding that “[i]n the absence of a burning issue, 
we saw that America was almost evenly divided on the issues, and that is exactly what we 
saw reflected in the election outcome”). 
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litical context in which Bush found himself—as an affiliated President 
in a divided government—and which he sought to transform into a 
reconstructive presidency, one of whose regime principles would 
have been the super-strong unitary presidency.  There is an obvious 
gap in the narrative I have provided, though.  What happened in the 
1990s?  The answer to that question will provide some opportunities 
to speculate about the future of the theory of the unitary executive. 
III.  THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY’S ALTERNATIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
In Skowronek’s terms, President Bill Clinton was a “preemptive” 
President.  Reagan’s reconstruction of U.S. politics remained rea-
sonably vibrant when Clinton took office, and was reinforced by the 
Republican congressional victories in 1994.  Acknowledging that the 
era of big government was over,34 Clinton, like any President, wanted 
to make his mark on public policy.  Facing a hostile Congress whose 
leaders believed that Reagan’s policies needed not preempting but 
extending, Clinton had to assert leadership by exercising the powers 
only he had.  Perhaps drawing upon but certainly transforming the 
intellectual resources provided by the then-extant theory of the uni-
tary executive, Clinton developed what Elena Kagan insightfully 
called “presidential administration.”35 
Presidential administration differs importantly from the theory of 
the unitary executive because it deploys different techniques to ac-
complish the goal, shared by both approaches, of overcoming bu-
reaucratic and legislative resistance to the President’s policy initia-
tives.  The theory of the unitary executive asserts that the White 
House is to control the bureaucracy.  In presidential administration, 
in contrast, the White House displaces the bureaucracy.36  Rather than 
 
 34 See, e.g., Bill Clinton, Radio Address (Jan. 27, 1996), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9601/budget/01-27/clinton_radio/ (“We will meet these chal-
lenges, not through big government.  The era of big government is over . . . .”). 
 35 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).  Like all institu-
tional developments, presidential administration had its predecessors, as Kagan points 
out, id. at 2275–76 (describing some early initiatives by Richard Nixon), but as she also 
insists, changes in scope amounted to a real innovation in form. 
 36 Kagan’s description of presidential administration as used in the Clinton administration 
emphasizes its use to control the development of regulatory policy outside the White 
House.  See, e.g., id. at 2282–83 (describing President Clinton’s role in developing anti-
smoking policy by the Food and Drug Administration).  Such uses might be explained as 
relatively straight-forward applications of the weak theory of the unitary executive, and 
indeed Kagan points out that "the Clinton administration 'built on the foundation of 
President Reagan's regulatory review process.'"  Id. at 2250.  Kagan’s deep insight, 
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controlling the processes of policy-making as they occur outside the 
White House, presidential administration brings policy-making over 
exactly the same domains into the White House.37 
Reconstructive Presidents might be attracted to the theory of the 
unitary executive, but that theory has its limits.  Presidential admini-
stration might supplement a strong theory of the unitary executive.38  
One technique Presidents might use is to increase the number of 
presidential appointees to executive bureaucracies—sub-cabinet offi-
cials who do not require Senate confirmation.39  Such appointees can 
serve as the President’s “eyes and ears” within the bureaucracy in ad-
dition to implementing presidential policy.  But, I suggest, presiden-
tial administration has an important advantage under current condi-
tions for a President who aspires to be reconstructive:  it offers a 
method of breaking the iron triangle that can obstruct reconstructive 
initiatives.  As the sputtering out of the Reagan Revolution showed, 
the theory of the unitary executive provides the intellectual resources 
to gain control of the government’s bureaucracies, but it cannot help 
in constructing institutional alternatives to those bureaucracies and 
indeed to some extent remains committed to their perpetuation, al-
beit under new leadership.  A more complete reconstruction requires 
working around or outside of the established bureaucracies, specifi-
cally by developing institutional forms that provide the President with 
the resources to construct a new political coalition. 
In the remainder of this Essay I speculate on the possibility that 
presidential administration may provide the Obama administration 
with the resources to implement what might be its reconstructive am-
bitions.  A preliminary point must be that, as Skowronek points out, 
each President faces the sedimented layers of what his predecessors 
have done.  Reconstructive Presidents try to burrow through those 
layers or even destroy them, but the simple passage of time means 
that this sort of reconstructive destruction becomes increasingly diffi-
cult.  Further, the sedimentation includes an accumulation of power 
in the presidency, something a reconstructive President will surely 
 
though, was that there was something new about the Clinton administration’s practices.  
The novelty was the institutional innovation of presidential administration—in particular, 
building institutional capacity within the White House to control policy development out-
side it. 
 37 Professor Farina’s contribution to this Symposium provides evidence about the growth of 
the White House staff that, I believe, supports Kagan’s account of the rise of presidential 
administration. 
 38 I thank Jacob Gersen for bringing this to my attention. 
 39 See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:  POLITICAL CONTROL 
AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008) (documenting the rise of such appointments). 
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find at least initially appealing and worth preserving.  Why should 
President Obama deprive himself of the ability to capitalize on the as-
sets the super-strong theory of the unitary presidency gives him?40  
This question, though, overlooks the possibility that a reconstructive 
President has goals in using presidential power different from those 
of affiliated or preemptive Presidents. 
As noted earlier, reconstruction requires the creation of new insti-
tutional forms.  Presidential administration is one of those forms.  
Devised to deal with Clinton’s difficulties as a preemptive President, it 
can be adapted to serve a reconstructive one.41  For example, beyond 
simply expanding the size of the White House staff, presidential ad-
ministration might encourage, or at least provide an explanation for, 
the creation of “bureaucracies” within the White House that parallel 
those outside it; a White House “energy czar” supervises the same pol-
icy domain as does the director of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, for example.  These parallel bureaucracies might be ex-
plained, at least at their initiation, as a method of institutionalizing 
the competition in providing policy advice that Richard Neustadt’s 
classic analysis contended was an important component of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s successes.42  Perhaps not coincidentally, Roosevelt was a 
reconstructive President, and we might regard the informal methods 
of producing competition in providing policy advice as his institu-
tional innovation.  White House czars with significant access to the 
President may exemplify a later, more formal institutional mecha-
nism in the same family. 
The theory of the unitary presidency attempts to shatter the iron 
triangle by depriving the bureaucracies of access to their interest 
group supports on one side and to Congress (and its committees and 
staff) on the other.  Presidential administration can perhaps be un-
 
 40 In the early months of the Obama presidency, one meme circulating among conservatives 
and strongly liberal critics of the administration’s policies, particularly in the area of na-
tional security, was that the administration had not substantially deviated from the Bush 
administration’s claims about the scope of the President’s authority even as the Obama 
administration asserted that it could advance its policy positions without pushing those 
claims to their limits.  See, e.g., Posting of Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner to Executive 
Watch:  A Weblog of the Duke Program in Public Law, http://executivewatch.net/ (Mar. 
23, 2009, 14:40 EST). 
 41 It may be worth noting the more general point that innovations in governance developed 
for one reason may be adapted and transformed to serve other goals. 
 42 See generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER:  THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 
(1960). 
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derstood to seek the same goal in a different manner.43  We can begin 
by asking why the interest groups that lobby Congress and the bu-
reaucracies will not simply turn their attention to lobbying the White 
House and the officials who implement presidential administration.  
They certainly will try to do so.44  But, bringing programs within the 
White House may reduce the lobbying power of these interest groups 
because their constituents may see smaller payoffs from lobbying 
than they can see when the iron triangle is operating well.  As Kagan 
noted, one feature of Clinton’s use of presidential administration was 
credit claiming—announcements by the White House of its responsi-
bility for policy initiatives formally taken outside the White House.  
One goal of such credit claiming is building political support from 
the constituencies of the external bureaucracies; environmentalists 
become supporters of the President rather than, or in addition to, 
enthusiasts of the Environmental Protection Agency and supporters 
of the Natural Resources Defense Council.  In this way presidential 
administration weakens one leg of the iron triangle.45 
More generally, the early days of the Obama administration sug-
gest that it has reconstructive ambitions that it seeks to achieve less by 
working with traditional interest groups than by working around 
them.46  The Obama campaign’s innovative use of the Web to raise 
money and generate enthusiasm is one example; so, in my view, is its 
vaunted bipartisan outreach, which is designed (I believe) to build a 
permanent Democratic majority at the 55% level rather than the 50% 
plus one level sought by George W. Bush, by appealing to independ-
ents and moderates in the country at large rather than to achieve leg-
islative successes in Washington.47  Bipartisan outreach of that sort is, 
 
 43 I note that I may be forcing too much into the category “presidential administration,” 
and that what I describe in the text might simply be reconstructive innovations inde-
pendent of presidential administration. 
 44 One suggestive indication is the response of such groups to a request by President Ob-
ama’s Office of Management and Budget for comments on how to improve the White 
House’s processes of regulatory review.  See Request for Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 
(Feb. 26, 2009).  Scores of interest groups submitted comments.  See Public Comments on 
OMB Recommendations for a New Executive Order on Regulatory Review, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp. 
 45 I must emphasize once again the speculative nature of my arguments, because the one 
sketched in this paragraph is perhaps the most speculative. 
 46 This is not to say that the Obama administration is insensitive to the continuing impor-
tance of such groups, but only that it does not see them as permanently important, as in-
stitutional components of its envisioned constitutional order to the same extent that they 
were institutional components of the New Deal/Great Society constitutional order. 
 47 For a similar analysis, cast in somewhat different terms, see Andrew Levison, Obama the 
Sociologist, DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIST, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org
/_memos/tds_SM_Levison.pdf. 
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again, an effort to break the hold of traditional interest groups on the 
government’s bureaucracies.48 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Of course we are early in the Obama administration.  What I have 
taken as indications of an interest in advancing a reconstructive 
agenda might simply be pragmatic tinkering or almost random inno-
vations.  And, equally obviously, events may derail whatever transfor-
mative ambitions the Obama administration might have.49 
I offer this Essay as a suggestion that scholars interested in the 
constitutional dimensions of presidential power should not be misled 
by apparent continuities in theories of the unitary executive.  Such 
theories do support the view that modern Presidents style themselves 
as leaders, but treating all versions of “the” theory of the unitary ex-
ecutive as roughly the same—and, in particular, seeing George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama as similar in their endorsement of expansive 
theories of executive authority—may be a mistake.  One must ask in 
addition, “Leadership for what?”  George W. Bush began as an affili-
ated President seeking to use the theory of the unitary executive he 
inherited for the tasks such a President faces.  He then saw the possi-
bility of becoming a reconstructive President, and used a revised ver-
sion of that theory in the service of a reconstructive project that failed 
in part because he did not use executive power to build new institu-
tions that would generate permanent political support for his recon-
structive policy agenda.  Perhaps Barack Obama will be able to use 
executive power and presidential administration to build such institu-
tions.  If so, he and his supporters will surely produce another itera-
tion of the theory of the unitary executive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 I would not place too much weight on these examples, but the nomination of a Nobel 
Prize winning scientist to head the Department of Energy and the aborted nomination of 
a Republican Senator to head the Commerce Department may hint at this outside-the-
traditional-interest-groups strategy.  (In contrast, the nomination of Representative Hilda 
Solis to head the Department of Labor shows that the Obama administration has not 
completely rejected the interest-group model for appointments.) 
 49 Just as events—those of September 11, 2001—opened up the possibility that the George 
W. Bush administration would be reconstructive rather than affiliated. 
